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I. INTRODUCTION
Many creditors argue that the bankruptcy system in the United States is
simply a haven for the deadbeat debtor who wants to rid himself of all the
responsibilities associated with the payment of debts.1 Although it is
understandable why creditors who cannot collect on their loans may feel this
way, their portrayal of debtors is misleading and has been proved in many
occasions to be erroneous. 2 Congressional faith in the debtors of America is
evident from the enactment of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978
("Bankruptcy Code").3 The Bankruptcy Code was enacted to protect the honest
debtor while simultaneously providing for the evenhanded treatment of the
honest debtor's creditors. 4 Many creditors, however, continued to believe that
the bankruptcy system as enacted in 1978 provided too many safeguards
protecting debtors at the expense of creditors.5 As a result, strong consumer
* I would like to thank Professor Nancy B. Rapoport for her guidance and inspiration
throughout the writing of this Note.
I Traditionally, society has identified debtors as falling into two different categories.
The first category is composed of the honest debtor who has had a run of bad luck and is
doing his best to pay off all of his outstanding debts. The second category is composed of
the opportunistic debtor who has gone on a spending spree and is using federal bankruptcy
law to free himself from the obligation of having to pay off his debts. See Karen Gross, Re-
Vision of the Bankruptcy System: New Images of Individual Debtors, 88 MICH. L. REv.
1506, 1514-15 (1990).
2 Debtors' profiles are in fact very similar to the profiles of average persons in the
community. Certainly some debtors abuse the system, but only a distinct minority. Most
debtors are not repeat parties in bankruptcy, are truly unable to pay their debts, and were
cautious when determining whether or not to enter into bankruptcy. Id. at 1516-17.
3 Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330
(1988 & Supp. V 1993) and as further amended at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (West Supp.
1995)).
4 THoMAs D. CRANDALL ET AL., THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDrrORS 10.02[21-[3]
(rev. ed. 1991).
5 See Richard E. Flint, Bankruptcy Policy: Towards a Moral Jufi cationfor Financial
Rehabilitation of the Consuner Debtor, 48 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 515, 517 (1991)
(explaining that society demanded a reduction in the number of consumer bankruptcies
through limiting the scope of the Bankruptcy Code).
To eliminate any discrepancies resulting from the uncertain meaning of the word
"individual," the author will use the term "consumer debtor" whenever the author refers to
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lending groups began lobbying Congress to amend the Bankruptcy Code in
order to place consumer lenders on a more equal playing field with consumer
debtors. 6
The consumer lenders' pressure persuaded Congress to implement
extensive amendments to the Bankruptcy Code under the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.7 Lenders gained substantial
protection under Title I, Subtitle A of the 1984 Amendments, 8 which were
entitled the "Consumer Credit Amendments." Through the Consumer Credit
Amendments, Congress added subsection (h) to section 362 (the automatic stay
provision) of the Bankruptcy Code. 9 Section 362(h) provides that "[a]n
individual injured by any willful violation of a stay provided by this section
shall recover actual damages, including costs and attorneys' fees, and, in
appropriate circumstances, may recover punitive damages."10
Since its enactment, section 362(h) has generated new controversies in
bankruptcy law. Federal courts and legal scholars continue to struggle with the
question of whether business debtors can use section 362(h) to recover damages
from creditors who violate the automatic stay or whether section 362(h) was
enacted as a protective measure for the exclusive benefit of consumer debtors.
This difficulty arises from the inability of courts to find a uniform definition for
a debtor who is a natural person.
61d.
7 Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C. and 11
U.S.C.). Congress had been forced to make some modifications to the Bankruptcy Code as
a result of the Supreme Court decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982). The Court in Pipeline held that the jurisdiction granted
to bankruptcy courts under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 was unconstitutional
because the Act granted bankruptcy judges jurisdictional powers that could only be granted
to Article IIIjudges. Id. at 87.
Although only required to amend the Bankruptcy Code's unconstitutional jurisdictional
provisions, Congress used the opportunity to enact new legislation in response to the strong
lobbying efforts of consumer lenders. This legislation effectively balanced the advantages
and disadvantages of the debtor and creditor relationship under the Bankruptcy Code. See
Lawrence K. Snider et al., The Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984, 63 MCH. B. J. 775, 775, 778 (1984).
8 Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
secs. 301-324, 98 Stat. 333, 352-58 (codified in scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.).
9 Id. at 352 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1988)). The automatic stay prohibits
entities from initiating or continuing any actions against the debtor, the debtor's property, or
property of the estate. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1995). This stay
goes into effect immediately upon the filing of a bankruptcy petition under any chapter of
the Bankruptcy Code. Id.
10 11 U.S.C. § 362(h) (1988) (emphasis added).
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the word "individual" as used in section 362(h). Consequently, in some courts,
section 362(h) can be used by business debtors to collect damages for violations
of the automatic stay, while in other courts, business debtors must seek relief
through the bankruptcy and district courts' contempt powers. 11
This Note will analyze the Consumer Credit Amendments and suggest that,
when Congress enacted section 362(h), Congress intended to fashion a remedy
for the exclusive benefit of consumer debtors. The Note will first discuss the
diverging interpretations that circuit courts give to section 362(h). Second, the
Note will discuss the United States Supreme Court's standard for statutory
interpretation and that standard's applicability to section 362(h). Next, the Note
will provide a background of the congressional intent behind the enactment of
section 362(h). Finally, this Note will conclude by suggesting that the term
"individual" as used in section 362(h) must be narrowly defined and, therefore,
must exclude business debtors.
II. HISTORICALTREATMENT OF 11 U.S.C. § 362(h)
Four circuits have considered the issue of whether section 362(h) provides
a damages remedy for the benefit of corporate debtors. The Third and Fourth
Circuits each ruled that section 362(h) must be interpreted to protect all debtors
because to rule otherwise would frustrate the purpose of the Bankruptcy
Code.12 Therefore, the Third and Fourth Circuits held that corporate debtors
are eligible to use section 362(h) to seek compensatory and punitive relief from
entities that violate the automatic stay.' 3 Conversely, the Second and Ninth
Circuits reasoned that interpreting the word "individual" as including only
natural persons does not conflict with the congressional intent of the Consumer
Credit Amendments, and therefore, corporate debtors cannot use section 362(h)
to seek damages from automatic stay violators.' 4 Although the courts reached
different conclusions on this issue, the reasoning of each court provides
persuasive arguments that need to be examined in detail.
11 See discussion infra part II.
12 Cuffee v. Atlantic Business and Community Dev. Corp., 901 F.2d 325 (3d Cir.
1990); Budget Service Co. v. Better Homes, Inc., 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986); see
discussion infra part II.A.
13 Cuffee, 901 F.2d at 329; Budget Service, 804 F.2d at 292.
14 Johnston Envtl. Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman), 991 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1993);
Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920 F.2d 183
(2d Cir. 1990); see discussion infra part II.B.
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A. Cases Holding that the Word "Individual" as Used in Section 362(h)
Encompasses Corporations
Two years after Congress passed the Consumer Credit Amendments of
1984, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit was forced to
decide whether or not section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code provided a
remedy of damages to corporate debtors that had been injured as a result of
creditors' violations of the automatic stay. The landmark case is Budget Service
Co. v. Better Homes, Inc.,15 and its reasoning was immediately followed by
many district courts that were faced with the same issue. 1 6
In Budget Service, the debtor, Better Homes, leased two trucks and a
station wagon from the creditor, Budget Service, a business involved in the
leasing of motor vehicles. 17 Subsequent to the lease agreement, Better Homes
filed a Chapter 11 reorganization petition and thereby obtained the debtor
benefits of the automatic stay.18 Better Homes defaulted on its lease payments
in December 1984. To collect on the defaulted payments, Budget Service's
president, Allen Bunch, entered onto the premises of Better Homes and
repossessed the leased trucks.
In response to Budget Service's collection actions, Better Homes filed a
motion in bankruptcy court seeking a contempt order against Budget Service
for violation of the automatic stay. 19 The bankruptcy court found Budget
Service "in [civil] contempt of Court for the violation of the automatic stay."20
15 804 F.2d 289.
16 See, e.g., Mallard Pond Partners v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co. (In re Mallard
Pond Partners), 113 B.R. 420 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1990); Schewe v. Fairview Estates (In
re Schewe), 94 B.R. 938 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1989).
17 Budget Service, 804 F.2d at 290.
18 Id. at 291.
19 1d.
20 Id. Better Homes claimed that the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction to issue civil
contempt orders under 11 U.S.C. § 105(a), which allows bankruptcy courts to "issue any
order, process, or judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of
[the Bankruptcy Code]," and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), which provides "bankruptcy judges
the power to hear 'all core proceedings arising under Title 11.'" Budget Service, 804 F.2d
at 291. Whether bankruptcy courts have this jurisdiction is an issue that has been the subject
of much debate.
Some courts and bankruptcy scholars argue that bankruptcy courts do not have the
power to issue civil contempt orders because they are not Article III courts, and civil
contempt orders can only be exercised by Article 111 courts. See Plastiras v. Idell (In re
Sequoia Auto Brokers, Ltd.), 827 F.2d 1281 (9th Cir. 1987). Proponents of this theory
contend that 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) cannot be interpreted to provide
statutory authority to bankruptcy courts to issue civil contempt orders because Congress did
[Vol. 56:617
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Additionally, the bankruptcy court certified the issue of criminal contempt to
the district court.2 1 The district court affirmed the civil contempt order of the
bankruptcy court, and after Budget Service plead guilty to criminal contempt,
the district court fined Budget Service in the amount of $500.22
Budget Service appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals,
challenging the constitutionality of the power of the bankruptcy court to issue
civil contempt orders.2 Interestingly, however, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals did not decide the issue of civil contempt brought before it, but rather
chose to dispose of the case under section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.24
The Fourth Circuit found that section 362(h) "must be read in conjunction
with the rest of § 362 and that its sanctions are not limited to the relief of an
'individual' in the literal sense." 25 The court went on to state that it was
"unlikely that Congress meant to give a remedy only to individual debtors
against those who willfully violate the automatic stay provisions of the
[Bankruptcy] Code as opposed to debtors which are corporations ... "26 The
court's reasoning centered on the concept that a narrow reading of section
362(h) would frustrate the purpose and policy of the automatic stay provision to
give debtors a "fresh start" and to permit debtors to attempt repayment or
reorganization plans. 27
At the same time that Budget Service and Better Homes were litigating
their case in the Fourth Circuit, another debtor corporation and creditor were
not specifically extend civil contempt powers to bankruptcy courts. See id. at 1284.
For a thorough discussion on the contempt power of bankruptcy courts, see William S.
Parkinson, The Contempt Power of the Bankruptcy Court-Fact or Fiction: 77 Debate
Continues, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 591 (1991).
21 Budget Service, 804 F.2d at 291.
2 2 1d. at 291 n.1.
23Id. at 291.
24 Id. at 291-92. The court stated,
While these questions raised by the parties [challenging the bankruptcy courts'
authority to issue civil contempt orders] are intriguing ones and while the statutory and
constitutional basis for a bankruptcy judge's issuance of civil contempt citations may be
unclear at this juncture in the seasoning of the new Bankruptcy Code, we need not
reach those issues because the bankruptcy court clearly had the power under § 362 of
the Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 362, to impose the sanctions that the district court
affimed ....
Id.
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involved in similar conduct that later found its way to the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals in Cuffee v. Atlantic Business and Community Development Corp.28
The Third Circuit held that the creditor violated the automatic stay and that his
actions were willful. 29 Acknowledging that section 362(h) was applicable to
"individuals," the court quickly disposed of the issue by citing Budget Service
and stating that "the section has uniformly been held to be applicable to a
corporate debtor."30 The Third Circuit never elaborated on the Budget Service
decision nor did it introduce any new reasoning that could expand the analysis
used by the Fourth Circuit.
B. Cases Holding that the Word "Individual" as Used in Section 362(h)
Limits Compensation to Consumer Debtors
Two circuits have refused to allow corporations to seek compensatory and
punitive damages under section 362(h). Eight months after the Cuffee ruling,
the Second Circuit issued the first federal court of appeals ruling that departed
from the so-called uniform application of the Third and Fourth Circuit Courts
of Appeals. In Maritime Asbestosis Legal ainic v. L7V Steel Co. (In re
28 901 F.2d 325 (3d Cir. 1990). In May 1986, Atlantic Business and Community
Development Corporation (ABCD), a radio station, filed a Chapter 11 petition in
bankruptcy court. Id. at 326. Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 1107 and § 1108, which allow a
debtor in possession to continue the operation of his business after the debtor has filed for
Chapter 11 reorganization, ABCD continued to broadcast its radio programs. The creditor,
Cuffee, was the owner of the following: the building in which the radio station was
operated, the studio equipment, the office furnishings, and the records and albums used for
the debtor's business. Cuffee attempted to evict ABCD on several occasions in April 1988.
The bankruptcy court issued a restraining order prohibiting Cuffee from exercising these
actions, but Cuffee refused to abide by the order. Id. at 326-27. As a result, the bankruptcy
court found that Cuffee violated the automatic stay provisions under § 362 of the
Bankruptcy Code, and therefore, awarded compensatory and punitive damages to the
corporate debtor in accordance with § 362(h). Id. at 327. Cuffee argued that he did not
violate the automatic stay, and alternatively, if he did violate the automatic stay, sanctions
were not warranted because his actions did not meet the willful standard mandated by
§ 362(h). Id. at 328-29.
29 Id. at 329. Violations of the automatic stay meet the willful requirement of § 362(h)
if (1) the entity violating the stay had actual knowledge of the stay and (2) that entity
intentionally executed actions that violated the stay. It is irrelevant that the actions of the
violating entity were done in good faith. Good faith is not a determinative element of
willfulness under § 362(h). J. Scott Humphrey, Sanctions Against the Creditor's Attorney in
Non-Reorganization Bankruptcy Proceedings, 6 BANKR. DEv. J. 481, 483-84 (1989).
30 Cuffee, 901 F.2d at 329.
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Chaeaugay Corp.),31 the debtor, LTV, filed a voluntary Chapter 11 petition
on July 17, 1986. Subsequently, in March 1989, the Maritime Asbestosis Legal
Clinic (MALC) filed an amended complaint to a previous lawsuit on behalf of
over 1300 plaintiffs who were allegedly exposed to asbestos. 32 LTV was
named as a defendant in thirty-eight of the complaints. 33 As a result of these
complaints, LTV sought an order from the bankruptcy court enjoining the
continuation of the thirty-eight actions against it and an order awarding LTV
compensatory and punitive damages pursuant to sections 105(a)34 and 362(h) of
the Bankruptcy Code.35 The bankruptcy court awarded damages under section
362(h) and held the request for contempt under section 105(a) in "abeyance." 36
The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling, and thus, MALC
appealed to the Second Circuit on four grounds. Although it conceded the first
three grounds, MALC continued to argue that the fourth claim, challenging the
applicability of section 362(h) to corporate debtors, provided sufficient grounds
for reversal of the district court's decision.37
The Second Circuit held that corporate debtors could not recover damages
under section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code.38 The Chateaugay court
reasoned: (1) the principles of statutory interpretation demand that the word
"individual" be defined by using its plain meaning;39 (2) the other uses of the
word "individual" in the Bankruptcy Code lead to one conclusion-the word
"individual" in section 362(h) means natural person;40 (3) because the
31 920 F.2d 183 (2d Cir. 1990).
32 Id.
33 Id. at 183-84.
34 See discussion supra note 20; see also Parkinson, supra note 20.
35 Ohateaugay, 920 F.2d at 184.
36 Id.
3 7 Id.
3 8 Id. at 186-87.
39 The court used the United States Supreme Court decision in United States v. Ron
Pair Enterprises, 489 U.S. 235 (1989), as precedent that the term "individual" must be
construed in its literal sense. See discussion infra part II.A.
40 Section 101(41) defines "person," and in its definition, it includes both the word
"individual" and the word "corporation": "'[Pierson' includes individual, partnership, and
corporation, but does not include governmental unit .... " 11 U.S.C.A. 101(41) (West
Supp. 1995). Therefore, it appears that Congress recognizes a difference between the words
"person" and "individual" and chooses these words carefully to limit or expand the
application of the statute.
Section 109(e) defines who may be a debtor under Chapter 13 as "an individual with
regular income." Id. at § 109(e). "[L]ndividual with regular income" is defined under
§ 101(30) as an "individual whose income is sufficiently stable and regular to enable such
individual to make payments...." 11 U.S.C. § 101(30) (Supp. V 1993). The term
1995]
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legislative history does not suggest that section 362(h) was enacted to protect
"persons" as defined in the Bankruptcy Code rather than natural persons and
because section 362(h) was enacted under the Consumer Credit Amendments,
the exclusion of corporate debtors under section 362 is not clearly contrary to
the intention of Congress; 41 and (4) the remedy of civil contempt is still
available to protect corporations, and it is possible that Congress intended to
provide broader protection to natural persons while not extending further
protection to corporations. 42
This issue was recently raised again in the Ninth Circuit. In Johnston
Environmental Corp. v. Knight (In re Goodman),43 the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals refused to allow corporations to use section 362(h) to obtain
compensatory damages against creditors that violated the automatic stay.44 The
"individual" is used in both § 109(e) and § 101(30), showing that § 101(30) was only
concerned with defining what constitutes regular income, as opposed to who constitutes an
individual that may file bankruptcies under Chapter 13. BRIAN A. BLUM, BANKRuPTCY AND
DEBTOR/CREDrrOR 201 (1993). It is clear that a Chapter 13 bankruptcy can be filed
voluntarily only by natural persons. Id. Therefore, one can conclude that the term
"individual" is used by Congress in the Bankruptcy Code when it intends to exclude
corporations from the provision.
For an in-depth analysis of other areas in which the term "individual" is used in the
Bankruptcy Code and how these uses are relevant to § 362(h), see Mary E. Norton, Section
362(h): Applicable to Corporate Debtors?, 56 Mo. L. REv. 769 (1991); Richard L. Stehl,
Eligibility for Damage Awards Under 11 U.S. C. § 362(h): 77w Second Answers the Riddle-
When Does Congress Actually Mean What It Says?, 65 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 1119 (1991).
41 See discussion infra part III.B.
42 Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920
F.2d 183, 184-85 (2d Cir. 1990).
43 991 F.2d 613 (9th Cir. 1993).
44 Id. at 619. In Goodman, the Knights, who were the creditors, owned and were
lessors of commercial rental property. Id. at 615. These three individual lessors were
threatened with criminal penalties if they did not correct numerous violations of the Santa
Ana Municipal Code on the rental property. These violations were attributable to the lessees
of the property. In order to remedy the violations, the Knights sent each lessee "Notices to
Quit." David Goodman, a sublessee of the property, having acquired his leasehold interest
through Johnston Environmental Corporation (Johnston), a corporation that was a lessee of
the Knights' property, had previously filed a Chapter 11 petition. Id. However, Johnston
was still served with the "Notice to Quit."
The bankruptcy court found the Knights in violation of the automatic stay; however, it
found that the violation was not willful, and therefore, damages under § 362(h) could not be
awarded. Id. The court did provide a remedy in the form of an injunction prohibiting the
Knights from pursuing any further detainer actions against the debtors. Id.
The Knights filed an appeal with the district court. Id. The district court not only
affirmed the injunction, but also reversed the bankruptcy court's finding that § 362(h) was
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court adopted the reasoning of the Second Circuit in Chateaugay and
acknowledged the importance of restricting the application of section 362(h) to
benefit solely natural persons. 45
The Goodman court stressed the major difference between the traditional
use of contempt orders to punish automatic stay violations and the use of
section 362(h) to compensate the debtor.46 Unlike section 362(h), contempt
orders are discretionary, and therefore, bankruptcy courts are not forced to
provide relief through civil contempt even when debtors qualify for such
relief.47 This distinction was crucial to the plaintiff in Goodman, because the
bankruptcy court's prior action indicated that it would use this discretion to
deny relief. The bankruptcy court had already refused to apply section 362(h)
on the grounds that the stay violation was not willful.4 8 The Ninth Circuit
stressed that this failure by the bankruptcy court to provide a remedy to the
corporate debtor indicated that, on remand, the bankruptcy court would use its
discretion to deny a request for a civil contempt order against the creditors,
thereby again refusing to grant a remedy to the corporate debtor.49
The Ninth Circuit ruling implies that failure to allow corporate debtors the
use of section 362(h) to seek compensatory and punitive relief from stay
violators will leave corporate debtors at the mercy of the courts.50 Although
this potential lack of remedy is exactly what concerned the Third and Fourth
Circuits, the Ninth Circuit did not believe that the unequal treatment of
consumer debtors and corporate debtors as a result of such ruling violated the
congressional intent behind the enactment of section 362(h).51 Therefore, the
Ninth Circuit reasoned that a literal definition of the word "individual" in
section 362(h) is mandated. 52
not appropriate in this case. Id.
The Knights then appealed the district court decision to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Id. Although the Ninth Circuit affirmed the injunction, it
refused to allow § 362(h) to be used by corporations to obtain compensatory damages
against creditors in violation of the automatic stay. Id. at 619.
45 Id. at 619-20.
46 If corporations are precluded from using § 362(h), then they can seek relief against
stay violators only through requests for civil contempt orders.
47 See infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text.
48 Goodman, 991 F.2d at 615.
49 Id. at 620.
50 See id.
5 1 Id. at 619.
52 Id.
1995]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Ill. ABSENT CONGRESSIONAL CLARIFICATION, SECTION 362(h) MUST BE
READ TO APPLY TO NATURAL PERSONS ONLY
As can be seen by the past treatment of section 362(h), circuit courts are
split on the issue of whether corporate debtors can claim relief under section
362(h). The following analysis will show that section 362(h) should be
enforced only when a consumer debtor has been the victim of an automatic stay
violation.
A. Plain Meaning of "Individual"
The United States Supreme Court held that the Bankruptcy Code should be
interpreted according to its terms, unless it is clear that the congressional
purpose behind the statute would be frustrated by such an interpretation. 53 The
Court explained that it is unrealistic to expect Congress to explain in detail its
reasoning and purpose behind the enactment of every portion of the Bankruptcy
Code.54 Therefore, "as long as the statutory scheme is coherent and consistent,
there generally is no need for a court to inquire beyond the plain language of
the statute. "55
The term at issue in section 362(h) is the word "individual." The common
definition of "individual" is "a single person as distinguished from a group or
class, and also, very commonly, a private or natural person as distinguished
from a partnership, corporation, or association .... "56 Black's Law
Dictionary recognizes, however, "that this restrictive signification is not
necessarily inherent in the word, and that it may, in proper cases, include
artificial persons." 57 Although some people may view the term "individual" to
encompass artificial persons, that interpretation is not the plain meaning of the
word. After the decision in United States v. Ron Pair Enterprises,58 it appears
that the term "individual" may include artificial persons only when a statutory
definition identifies "individual" to include artificial persons or when the intent
of Congress behind a statute is clearly frustrated by the common definition of
the word "individual." 59
53 United States v. Ron Pair Enters., 489 U.S. 235, 240 (1989).
54 1d.
55 Id.
5 6 BLACK'S LAWDIcriONARY 773 (6th ed. 1990).57 Id.
58 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
59 Id. at 241 (explaining that the courts' function "is to enforce [the statute] according
to its terms").
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The Bankruptcy Code does not provide a statutory definition for the word
"individual." Nevertheless, Congress acknowledged that the word "individual"
does not include artificial persons because it defined the word "person" under
section 101(41) of the Bankruptcy Code by using the word "individual" while
also using the words "partnership" and "corporation. "60 This definition
demonstrates that Congress will use the word "persons" when it seeks to
include natural persons as well as artificial persons, but it will use the word
"individual" when it seeks to limit the application of the statute by excluding
artificial persons.
Unless the "literal application of a statute will produce a result
demonstrably at odds with the intentions of its drafters," 61 courts are prohibited
from making calculated guesses about what Congress did or did not intend and
they must use the plain meaning of the word. 62 Therefore, the word
"individual" as used in section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code can include only
natural persons unless it is clear that the congressional intent behind section
362(h) is frustrated by this definition. 63 The congressional intent, however, is
not endangered by a narrow definition of the term "individual." 64 Actually, as
the following section will show, congressional goals are strengthened by
narrowly defining the word "individual" in section 362(h).
B. Congressional Intent
In determining the congressional intent in using the word "individual" in
section 362(h), one must interpret the statutory history of the Bankruptcy Code
and section 362(h).
1. The Purpose of the Bankruptcy Code and Section 362(h)
The Bankruptcy Code has two primary purposes: (1) to achieve the
evenhanded treatment of creditors by ensuring the "equitable distribution of the
60 11 U.S.C.A. § 101(41) (West Supp. 1995); see Norton, supra note 40; Stehl, supra
note 40. This definition is one of the convincing factors that led to the Second Circuit's
holding that prohibited the enforcement of § 362(h) in cases in which the debtors are
corporations. Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.),
920 F.2d 183, 184 (2d Cir. 1990).
61 Ron Pair, 489 U.S. at 242.
62 Id.
63 See Chateaugay, 920 F.2d at 184 (explaining that Ron Pair mandated that the plain
meaning of "individual" be used and that § 362(h) can protect only consumer debtors
because the intent of Congress is not frustrated by this interpretation).
64 See id.
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debtor's assets" and (2) to provide the honest debtor with relief from his
debts. 65 The automatic stay was one of the provisions enacted to enable parties
using the Bankruptcy Code to achieve both of these goals.66 Congress
identified the purpose of the automatic stay to protect debtors as follows:
The automatic stay is one of the fundamental debtor protections provided
by the bankruptcy laws. It gives the debtor a breathing spell from his creditors.
It stops all collection efforts, all harassment, and all foreclosure actions. It
permits the debtor to attempt a repayment or reorganization plan .... 67
Congress also enacted the automatic stay as a provision providing protection to
creditors:
The automatic stay also provides creditor protection. Without it, certain
creditors would be able to pursue their own remedies against the debtor's
property. Those who acted first would obtain payment of the claims in
preference to and to the detriment of other creditors. Bankruptcy is designed to
provide an orderly liquidation procedure under which all creditors are treated
equally. A race of diligence by creditors for the debtor's assets prevents that.68
The purpose behind the enactment of section 362(h) is not as clear as the
purpose behind the Bankruptcy Code and the automatic stay. However, a study
of the legislative history surrounding the 1984 Consumer Credit Amendments
discloses the possible congressional goals behind the damages provision of
section 362(h).
Congress enacted the Consumer Credit Amendments in response to
consumer lenders' concerns that the bankruptcy system provided too many
65 Arnold M. Quittner, Overview: History of the Bankruptcy Code and Prior
Bankruptcy Laws, 441 PLI/CoMM 7 (1987); see CRANDALL, supra note 4, at 10.02[2]-[3].
66 Compare 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY 362.04 (Lawrence P. King et al. eds., 15th
ed. 1987) (explaining that the automatic stay protects both creditors and debtors) with
CRANDALL, supra note 4, at 10.02[2]-[31 and Quittner, supra note 62 (each stating that
the purpose of the Bankruptcy Code was to protect debtors by giving them a fresh start and
to provide creditors with "evenhanded" treatment).
67 H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 340 (1978), reprinted in 1978
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5963, 6296-97.
68 Id. at 6297. The automatic stay has a broad scope which is defined under § 362(a).
See 11 U.S.C.A. § 362(a) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1995). It generally protects the estate
property, the debtor's property, and the debtor from actions by entities that are trying to
collect debts from the debtor or obtain judgments against the debtor. See 2 COLLIER ON
BANKRUPrCY, supra note 66, 362.01. Section 362(b) provides some exceptions to actions
that are prohibited by the automatic stay. 11 U.S.C.A. § 362 (b) (West 1993 & West Supp.
1995).
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loopholes for debtors at the expense of consumer lenders. 69 Therefore, the
provisions enacted under the Consumer Credit Amendments were included to
provide advantages to consumer creditors who primarily negotiated with
consumer debtors. 70 Thus, although on its face section 362(h) appears to
provide protection to debtors, the Amendments were enacted to protect
consumer creditors from consumer debtors, not from corporate debtors. 71
Hence, the applicability of section 362(h) must be consistent with the
congressional goals to protect both consumer creditors and consumer debtors.
2. Section 362(h) Provides Protection to Creditors of Conswner Debtors
In Budget Service Co. v. Better Homes, Inc.,72 the Fourth Circuit held that
refusal to allow corporate debtors to use section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code
as a remedial measure against entities that have violated the automatic stay
would frustrate the purpose for which section 362 was enacted. 73 The Budget
Service court reasoned that section 362(h) had to be read in conjunction with
the rest of section 362.74 However, in attempting to do so, the court never
considered the creditor protection function of the automatic stay.75
As previously discussed, both the Consumer Credit Amendments of 1984
and the automatic stay provision as enacted by Congress under the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978 have a policy of protecting creditors from the unwarranted
and abusive loss of their assets and investments. 76 Although it has never been
69 See supra notes 5-8 and accompanying text.
70 Senator Hatch explained,
The number of consumer bankruptcy cases filed has risen dramatically each year
since the bankruptcy code was last amended in 1978.... The 1978 amendments
generally eased a debtor' [sic] access to bankruptcy to avoid excessive indebtedness.
Title I [sic] contains over 30 substantive amendments to curb abuses of the bankruptcy
code and make its use truly a last resort.
130 CONG. REc. 20,088 (1984) (statement of Senator Hatch). Although Senator Hatch
identified Title II, it is clear from the text that he was referring to Title III.
71 See Ronald M. Martin & Terrence P. Fagan, A Guide to the Bankruptcy
Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, 13 CoLo. LAw. 1775, 1777 (1984).
72 804 F.2d 289 (4th Cir. 1986).
73 Id.74 Id.
75 See discussion supra part ll.A.
76 See discussion supra part I.B.1. "[lit is not surprising that, with few exceptions,
[Consumer Credit] Amendments shift the balance of rights decidedly in favor of creditors."
Karen Gross, Preserving a Fresh Start for the Individual Debtor: 77e Case for Narrow
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previously argued, it is certainly plausible that Congress enacted section 362(h)
as part of the Consumer Credit Amendments because Congress intended to
provide a benefit to consumer creditors. The primary lobbyists for the
Consumer Credit Amendments were consumer lenders who primarily provided
loans to natural persons rather than to corporations. 77 Congress responded to
their lobbying effort by amending existing provisions and enacting new
provisions that would ensure that individual debtors would use bankruptcy as a
remedy only when necessary and that creditors would not sustain unnecessary
losses as a result of the bankruptcy laws.78
Furthermore, one of the major goals of the Consumer Credit Amendments
was to give individuals incentives to choose Chapter 13 reorganization
bankruptcy instead of Chapter 7 liquidation. 79 This goal, of course, is only
applicable to individuals because corporations are not eligible to file under
Chapter 13.80 In fact, no substantive amendments were made to any Chapter 11
provisions under the Consumer Credit Amendments. 8 Thus, it is apparent that
Congress was only concerned with the relationship between consumer debtors
and consumer lenders, rather than the relationship between corporate debtors
and corporate lenders.
Given that the automatic stay provision of the Bankruptcy Code has an
overall purpose of protecting creditors and that the Consumer Credit
Amendments were primarily concerned with the protection of the creditors of
consumer debtors, it is rational to surmise that Congress enacted section 362(h)
Construction of the Conswner CreditAmendments, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 83 (1986).
77 See Snider et al., supra note 7, at 778.
78 See 130 CONG. REc. 20,088 (1984) (statement of Senator Hatch).
79 "[T]he Code continues and purportedly expands its attempt to encourage them to do
so." Paul M. Black & Michael J. Herbert, Bankcard's Revenge: A Critique of the 1984
Consumer Credit Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 845, 852
(1985).
80 Section 109(e) provides that only "individuals with regular income" may file under
Chapter 13. 11 U.S.C.A. § 109(e) (West Supp. 1995). "Individuals with regular income" is
defined under § 101(30) and is interpreted to apply only to natural persons. 11 U.S.C.
§ 101(30) (Supp. V 1993); see 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUrcY, supra note 66, 109.50
(explaining that Chapter 13 was not intended to protect partnerships).
81 The only amendments made to Chapter 11 provisions under the Consumer Credit
Amendments were made to § 1103(b) and § 1106(a)(1). Section 1106(a)(1) was amended
only to incorporate the new subsection numbers used under the amended § 704. See
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
sec. 311(b)(1), 98 Stat. 333, 355 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1) (1988)). The
amendment to § 1103(b) narrowed the limitations placed on representatives of creditors'
committees by making the limitations applicable only to representatives who are attorneys
or accountants.
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provision was to protect consumer creditors. This reasoning is based on the
fact that section 362(h) serves two purposes: it is a remedy provision and it also
serves a deterrent role. The remedy provided to individual debtors by section
362(h) is the most severe remedy available to any debtor who is seeking
damages for violations of the automatic stay.82 Section 362(h) is a mandatory
provision, and therefore, courts do not have any discretion in determining
whether or not to award damages when a willful violation of the stay has
occurred.8 3 More importantly, the test to enforce the remedy is less stringent
than the test used by the courts to determine if a contempt order is warranted. 84
As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that in enacting section 362(h),
Congress intended to protect the creditors of natural persons and not to protect
the debtors themselves. The creditor protection comes from the following
warning to automatic stay violators: if you violate the automatic stay at the
expense of other creditors of bankrupt individuals, you will face a penalty that
is mandatory and severe.
The above reasoning does not apply to creditors of corporations and
partnerships. Corporate and partnership creditors do not require the same
stringent protection that consumer creditors do for two simple reasons. First,
corporate and partnership debtors cannot receive discharges under Chapter 7.85
Second, when corporate and partnership debtors file for Chapter 11, they
82 The automatic stay contains no other remedy provisions. Therefore, contempt was
the only remedy available prior to the enactment of § 362(h). Contempt is not as potent
because it is discretionary and has only been used when the entity violating the stay was
malicious. Ron Weiss, Contempt Power of the Bankruptcy Court, 6 BANKR. DEv. J. 205,
208 (1989).
Contempt can be defined as a willful disregard or disobedience of a public authority.
There a... two types of contempt--civil and criminal. The distinction between the
two lies in the nature of the contemptuous act and the manner in which the court
addresses it. Civil contempt is... an act against the party in whose behalf the court's
order was issued. Any sanction imposed by the court which is intended to coerce
compliance with the court's ruling is a civil contempt sanction. On the other hand,
conduct which is injurious to the sanctity of the court or its proceedings is criminal
contempt.
Parkinson, supra note 20, at 592.
83 Martin & Fagan, supra note 71, at 1778.
84 See Weiss, supra note 82, at 208 (explaining that contempt is not an extremely
potent remedy because contempt is discretionary and has only been used when the entity
violating the stay was malicious).
85 Section 727(a)(1) provides that only natural persons can be given discharges under
Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1988).
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Second, when corporate and partnership debtors file for Chapter 11, they
subject themselves to substantial control by their creditors. 86 Chapter 11
creditors play a much more active role in the bankruptcy proceedings. Impaired
creditors have the right to vote on any proposed plans, 87 and they may even
propose their own plan if the debtor has not proposed a suitable plan within the
time guidelines provided by the Bankruptcy Code.8 8 Thus, the creditors of
corporate and partnership debtors, under Chapter 7, have the satisfaction that
the debtors will not receive their discharge, while Chapter 11 impaired
creditors have sufficient authorized powers under the Bankruptcy Code to
provide them with leverage in bargaining for a suitable plan of reorganization.
This analysis demonstrates that the Fourth Circuit's reasoning in Budget
Service was incomplete. In Budget Service, the court looked for the intent of
Congress in enacting section 362(h) by looking at section 362(h) in conjunction
with the debtor protection purpose of the automatic stay.89 However, the court
failed to analyze section 362(h) against the other important goal of the
automatic stay-the goal to provide protection to the creditor. On the other
hand, the Second Circuit, in providing a strict interpretation to section 362(h),
stated,
[S]ubsection (h) was included as part of the Bankruptcy Amendments and
Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 352 (1984).
The rest of § 362 had been enacted in 1978. Therefore, legislative history and
construction which support broad coverage for the automatic stay imposed by
§ 362(a) do not necessarily apply to subsection (h)... [which] was included as
part of Title MI, Subtitle A, See. 304 of Public Law 98-353, entitled
"Consumer Credit Amendments," which contains numerous additions to the
code relating only to "individuals." 90
The Chateaugay court's statement reinforces the argument that the complete
legislative history of section 362(h) cannot be evaluated unless the history
86 Sections 1121 and 1126 provide creditors with powers to control some of the
debtor's actions. Creditors can draft plans after 120 days have elapsed from the date of the
order of relief if the debtor did not file a plan or 180 days from that date if the debtor's plan
has not been accepted. 11 U.S.C.A. § 1121(c) (West 1993 & West Supp. 1995).
Furthermore, creditors with impaired claims vote on any proposed plans and, in some
instances, they can force the confirmation of a plan if the plan has been approved by one
impaired class. 11 U.S.C. § 1126 (1988).
87 11 U.S.C. § 1126.
88 11 U.S.C. § 1121.
89 See discussion supra part II.A.
9 0 Maritime Asbestosis Legal Clinic v. LTV Steel Co. (In re Chateaugay Corp.), 920
F.2d 183, 185 (2d Cir. 1990).
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Federal Judgeship Act of 1984 is analyzed in conjunction with the purpose of
the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 and its automatic stay provision. All of
these congressional actions have a policy of protecting the creditors and,
therefore, it is consistent with such a policy to interpret section 362(h) as
having the purpose of protecting the creditors of consumer debtors.
Allowing only consumer debtors to seek relief under section 362(h) is not
in conflict with the purpose of the automatic stay or the Consumer Credit
Amendments because both of these provisions protect creditors. Congress
simply chose to protect consumer lenders under the Consumer Credit
Amendments, and it used section 362(h) to provide that protection by enacting
stiff penalties from which consumer debtors can benefit if consumer lenders
violate the stay.
3. Section 362(h) Justifiably Provides Greater Protection to Consumer
Debtors
Proponents of the expanded interpretation of the automatic stay provision
may argue that the award of remedies to a debtor can only be interpreted to
mean that Congress intended all debtors to benefit from section 362(h).
Assuming, however, that Congress was only concerned with protecting debtors
when it enacted section 362(h), it is still within the power of Congress, and
consistent with the Bankruptcy Code, for Congress to provide greater
protections to individual debtors than to corporate and partnership debtors.
The Fourth Circuit has reviewed section 362(h) in accordance with the
overall purpose of the automatic stay.91 However, the policies behind section
362(h) should also be evaluated in accordance with the Bankruptcy Code as a
whole. One must raise the following question: Is it consistent with the
Bankruptcy Code's history that Congress would want to protect consumer
debtors more than corporate debtors? The answer is yes.
The Bankruptcy Code has always shown considerable leniency towards
consumer debtors.92 Chapter 7 is a suitable example of this association. Under
Chapter 7, consumer debtors are afforded the opportunity to claim exemptions
and are provided discharges. Corporate and partnership debtors, on the other
hand, do not receive a fresh start under Chapter 7. They are not eligible to
claim any exemptions 93 and are also precluded from receiving any discharges
91 Budget Service Co. v. Better Homes, Inc., 804 F.2d 289, 292 (4th Cir. 1986)
(agreeing with the decision of a bankruptcy court in Connecticut that read § 362(h) in
conjunction with the rest of § 362).
92 See supra notes 85-88 and accompanying text.
93 Section 522 provides Chapter 7 exemptions only to individual debtors. 11 U.S.C.A.
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from their debts.94 These rules are consistent with the impact that Chapter 7
bankruptcy has on corporate debtors. Corporate debtors that choose the option
of liquidation under the bankruptcy system have given up hope of survival and
are therefore terminating their business. However, it is the fact that corporate
debtors will not survive after a Chapter 7 bankruptcy that leads to the reasoning
that corporate debtors do not need the protection that consumer debtors do.
Why compensate a corporation that in a few months will no longer exist?
Compensation for dying corporations only makes sense in the extraordinary
situation in which creditors are abusing the bankruptcy system or are reaping
benefits at the expense of other unsecured creditors. Remedies for these types
of actions already exist in the form of civil contempt. 95
Congress also provided some advantages to consumer debtors under
Chapter 13 that are not available to corporate debtors. A comparison of
Chapter 13 and Chapter 11 reveals that individual debtors have substantially
greater benefits in reorganizations than those provided to corporations under
Chapter 11.96 First, consumer debtors can only enter into Chapter 13
bankruptcies voluntarily, while corporate debtors can be forced involuntarily
into Chapter 11 bankruptcies. 97 Second, consumer debtors have complete
control over the drafting of the plan of reorganization without any creditor
input, 98 while corporate debtors' plans may be filed by creditors if the debtors
fail to follow the filing schedule under section 1121. 99
A study of the treatment of consumer debtors and corporate debtors under
the Bankruptcy Code shows that Congress has, in numerous provisions,
provided greater protection and advantages to consumer debtors than to
corporate debtors. Therefore, it is not irrational to conclude that Congress
enacted section 362(h) of the Bankruptcy Code as another provision that
provides consumer debtors with protection substantially greater than that shared
by corporate debtors.
§ 522 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1995).
94 Section 727(a)(1) does not grant a discharge to the corporate or partnership debtor,
and thus, that debtor cannot gain a fresh start. 11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(1) (1988).
95 See discussion supra note 20.
96 Congress intended to provide these advantages and used the Consumer Credit
Amendments to enhance the rights of debtors that choose Chapter 13. See supra notes 7-10
and accompanying text.
97 Section 303(a) provides that involuntary reorganization bankruptcies can only be
imposed against debtors under Chapter 7 and Chapter 11. 11 U.S.C. § 303(a) (1988).
Therefore, corporations are always subject to involuntary petitions, but individual debtors
cannot be forced into a Chapter 13 reorganization bankruptcy involuntarily.
98 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 1321-1322 (West 1993 & West Supp. 1995).
99 See discussion supra note 86.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Determining the congressional intent behind the enactment of section
362(h) is not a simple task because Congress has never expressly discussed the
provision. Moreover, the determination cannot be made by simply looking at
the legislative history of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. The analysis
must be conducted by studying the purpose of the automatic stay provision
under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 in conjunction with the purpose
behind the Consumer Credit Amendments of 1984. This study reveals that the
creditor protection purpose of the automatic stay is consistent with the
protection sought by consumer creditors under the Consumer Credit
Amendments. Also, deference to individual creditors of consumer debtors is
commonplace under the Bankruptcy Code. Therefore, because congressional
intent behind the Bankruptcy Code is not frustrated by the exclusive use of
section 362(h) by consumer debtors, the plain meaning of the word
"individual," defined as "natural persons as distinguished from a partnership,
corporation, or association," must be used until Congress amends section
362(h) or expresses its specific contrary intent behind this damages provision of
the automatic stay.
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